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National Repositories of Information: A
Comparison of the National Practitioner
Data Bank in the United States and the
National Confidential Enquiry into
Perioperative Deaths in the United Kingdom*
Gail Daubert**
INTRODUCrION

Medical error, clinical negligence, or medical malpracticeregardless of its label, society pays when physicians fail to exercise the standard of care necessary to provide quality health
care. While the victimized patients suffer needless pain and injury, they may be unable to return to work as well. Thus, not
only does the injured patient lose wages, but society loses a productive citizen. Society also pays for the increase in the use of
social services as well as the payment of social security disability
benefits and sometimes even death benefits. Ultimately, it is the
future health care consumer who pays the costs through higher
health care insurance premiums and the defensive practice of
medicine.
Studies suggest that only a small percentage of injured patients actually file complaints-medical malpractice claims reflect only a small portion of the number of patients injured by
medical malpractice. Results from the Harvard Medical Practice Study indicate that in New York State, during a particular
time period, seven times as many patients suffered an injury
caused by medical negligence as filed medical malpractice suits.'
The American Bar Foundation (ABF) Study in Chicago revealed that forty-four percent of patients experienced at least
one medical error during their hospitalization and fourteen per* This paper was submitted for the London Comparative Health Law Program
sponsored by Loyola University Chicago School of Law Institute for Health Law.
** Ms. Daubert is a surgical nurse currently enrolled at American University
Washington College of Law in Washington, D.C. She received her Master of Jurispru-

dence in Health Law from Loyola University Chicago School of Law, her Bachelor of
Science from Northwestern University, and her registered nurse degree from Rock
Valley College.
1.

PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACrICE 69 (1993).
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cent of patients were seriously injured by medical errors.2 Of
the seriously injured patients, only three percent brought legal
claims.3 Strikingly, the ABF Study found only twenty-four percent of the errors that were observed were documented, and little effort was made to channel the information to others who
might implement plans to prevent future errors. Similarly,
Management Prescriptives, a health care education and information company, revealed data from one hospital that documented 1057 adverse events arising from 7275 admissions, that
is, fourteen and one-half percent. Of those 1057 adverse
events, 457 resulted in "adverse outcomes" that led to 4891 additional patient days and cost $27 million. 6 These studies
demonstrate that the cost of medical error and the injuries suffered by patients far exceed that which has been previously
acknowledged.
Comparable data on patients injured by medical negligence
are unavailable from the United Kingdom. However, one can
speculate that if like studies were conducted, the findings would
be similar. Given the United Kingdom's "loser pays costs" system and the prohibition on contingent fees, it is easy to conclude
that far fewer injured patients file complaints or claims in the
United Kingdom than in the United States.
Considering both the concrete and intangible elements, it is
extremely difficult to calculate the actual cost of medical negligence. Though many statistics are available in the United
States, the variability in estimates makes it difficult to give accurate information; with the United Kingdom's dearth of statistics,
it is impossible to calculate or compare the financial cost of
medical negligence in the two countries. Financial costs aside, it
is simply unacceptable to allow preventable medical injuries.
Currently, government officials in both the United States and
the United Kingdom are under pressure to improve the quality
of health care services while at the same time containing costs.
The 1990 reforms of the National Health Service (NHS) in the
2. Catherine S. Meschievitz, Efficacious or Precarious?Comments on the Processing and Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims in the United States, 3 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 123, 127-28 (1994) (defining serious injury as a temporary or permanent
disability or death).
3. Id. at 128.
4. Id.
5. Jay Greene, Software Helps Hospitals Cut Back on Job, Expense of Patient-Care
'Rework,' MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 2, 1995, at 51.
6. Id.
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United Kingdom 7 and the national and state health care reform
bills proposed in the United States reflect each respective country's concerns over access, cost, and quality of health care.
Quality improvement measures mandated via legislation, such
as the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA),8 can
help decrease medical errors and reduce clinical negligence by
identifying incompetent health care practitioners. Any plan that
reduces incompetent medical care improves the quality of care.
In turn, these measures help protect patients from needless injuries and ultimately reduce the cost of health care.
This article examines the National Practitioner Data Bank,
the United States' record keeping system designed to track and
monitor physicians who have either settled a malpractice claim
or had disciplinary action taken against them, and compares it
with the National Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative
Deaths (NCEPOD), a system employed by the United Kingdom
to analyze the cause of perioperative deaths. NCEPOD is not
affiliated with the United Kingdom's Department of Health; it is
run entirely by representatives of the Royal Colleges of
Medicine and other faculties concerned with the management of
surgical patients. 9 The goal of both systems is to improve the
quality of medical care.
Numerous articles have been written about the HCQIA and
the data bank. This article will not repeat the details of each,
but instead will compare the data bank with the English system
of tracking adverse medical incidents.
I.

THE UNITED STATES' REPORTING SYSTEM: THE
NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK

Providers of health care in the United States have long recognized the importance of quality assurance programs as components of quality health care services. 10 Hospitals use
accreditation commissions, risk management and quality assur7. See John H. Tingle, The Allocation of Healthcare Resources in the National
Health Service in England: Professionaland Legal Issues, 2 ANNALS HEALTH L. 195
(1993).
8. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-52 (1994).
9. Dr. John N. Lunn, NCEPOD Past, and Future?, AVMA MED. & LEGAL J.,
Autumn 1993, at 6.
10. See N. Jean Schendel, Banking on Confidentiality: Should Consumers be Allowed Access to the National PractitionerData Bank? 27 J. HEALTH & HOsp. L. 289,
290 (1994) (noting that peer review advanced with the formation of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Oranizations in 1952).
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ance programs, and peer reviews 1 to monitor and maintain
quality health care. Equally important, state licensing boards
regulate and monitor health care professionals to safeguard the
public's health and welfare. However, individual states could
not identify physicians disciplined in other states. In turn, hospitals' credentialing committees could not realistically consult all
fifty states to identify a physician's past misdeeds. To prevent
incompetent doctors ousted from one hospital or state from
practicing elsewhere and potentially harming other patients,
Congress enacted the HCQIA in 198612 to, among other things,
establish a national tracking system of physician competency.
This tracking system is the National Practitioner Data Bank.
A.

The Purpose and Design of the Data Bank

The impetus for the legislation and, ultimately, the Data
Bank's design came after members of Congress heard compelling testimony indicating that a few "bad apples" were spoiling
the profession's reputation and were primarily responsible for
the majority of patient injuries. 13 One report cited a physician
who had been sued thirty-four times yet remained in practice
until he sold Quaaludes to an undercover agent. 14 As hard as
this type of incident is to envision, physicians could have gotten
away with it because hospitals might have been afraid to report
them, or because the physicians could have avoided detection by
moving from hospital to hospital or state to state.
Before the HCQIA, hospitals did not normally disclose the
fact that they had revoked a physician's privileges. 15 Usually,
the fear of a lawsuit brought by an ousted physician kept hospitals quiet. It is easy to see the hospital's awkward position: on
the one hand, the hospital wanted to remove the physician to
avoid future liability for physician incompetence and to assure
quality of care for its patients, while on the other hand, the hospital feared the physician would sue it, alleging a damaged pro11.

The term "hospital" is used throughout this paper for sake of convenience, but

it is meant to encompass all types of health care entities that provide health care
services and follow formal peer review processes, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.
§ 11151(4)(A) (1994).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 11101-52 (1994). Congress found that such tracking was beyond
the scope of an individual state's ability. 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (1994).
13. Elisabeth Ryzen, The National Practitioner Data Bank: Problems and Proposed Reforms, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 409, 414 (1992).
14. Id.

15.

H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6385.
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fessional reputation caused by the removal. As a result, a
hospital might accept the physician's "plea bargain": the physician would quietly submit a voluntary resignation, which the
hospital would quietly accept without disclosure of the reasons. 16 Unfortunately, this allowed the "bad doc" to "set up
shop elsewhere," continue to practice medicine, and likely cause
more unnecessary patient injuries.
The desire to end this scenario was a motivating factor behind
the passage of the HCQIA. The goal was to decrease the incidence of medical malpractice by preventing an incompetent
doctor who lost privileges at one hospital from simply obtaining
privileges at another hospital and injuring more patients. The
solution was to establish a national data bank that contained
pertinent information reflecting a physician's practices, thus
providing hospitals with a necessary tool of nationwide information about physician misconduct and alleged liability. '
The Data Bank functions on a system of information reporting and retrieval. The reporting aspect is obviously crucial.
Therefore, Congress put the onus on four types of entities. First,
state medical boards must report all disciplinary and adverse licensure actions that relate to the competence or professional
conduct of a practitioner, including all censures and reprimands. 19 The medical board must include a description of the
"acts or omissions or other reasons" for the disciplinary action.2 °
Failure to report will result in the Secretary of Health and
Human Services designating another qualified entity that would
be responsible for reporting the information in the future. 21
Congress further requires a hospital that takes action that adversely affects a practitioner's clinical privileges for more than
thirty days to report that action to the Board of Medical Examiners in the state in which the hospital is located, which in turn
22
must report the information to the Data Bank.
Second, Congress made it incumbent on hospitals to report
voluntary surrenders of privileges conditioned on the hospital's
16. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6385. See also Ryzen, supra note 13,
at 414.
17. See Ryzen, supra note 13, at 414.
18. H.R. Rep. No. 903, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6385.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 11132(a)(1)(A) (1994).
20. Id. at § 11132(a)(2)(B).
21. Id. at § 11132(b).
22. Id. at 88 11133(a)(1) & 11134. Entities may, but are not required to, report
other health care practitioners who are not physicians. Id. at § 11133(a)(2).
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agreement to refrain from investigating an incident.23 This last
provision was added to end the practice of doctors "plea bargaining" to avoid being reported. If a hospital fails to comply

with the reporting provisions, it loses its peer review immunity.24

Third, Congress directed that "[e]ach entity ... [that] makes
payment under a policy of insurance, self-insurance, or other-

wise in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in satisfaction of
a judgment in, a medical malpractice action or claim shall report
. . .information respecting the payment and circumstances
thereof" to the Data Bank. 25 Congress provided a serious incentive for compliance: if an entity fails to report that it paid a
claim, it can be subjected to a penalty of up to $10,000.26 While
the mandatory reporting of malpractice settlements generated a
substantial amount of debate, and Congress conceded that mal-

practice data should be viewed with caution, noting that many
considerations other than the validity of the claim contribute to
settlements, Congress concluded that "on balance, [the data]
27
will prove to be extremely useful.

23. Id. at § 11133(a)(1)(A), (B).
24. Id. at § 11133(c)(1). See id. at § 11111(b) (providing for loss of peer review
immunity for three years).
25. Id. at § 11131(a).
26. Id. at § 11131(c). However, the reporting or penalty provision does not apply
to payments made by individual physicians.
27. H.R. Rep. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6396. This contention was based on the fact that neither the state disciplinary boards
nor the peer review system could adequately identify many incompetent practitioners,
since a typical aggrieved patient turns to the court system and files a malpractice suit
to deal with inadequate medical care. Accordingly, Congress believed the malpractice data would provide "important clues for evaluating the credentials of health care
practitioners," recognizing that "those authorized ... to gain access to this information will have the awareness and sensitivity to use it responsibly." Id. Congress added: "In interpreting information reported under this part, a payment in settlement of
a medical malpractice action or claim shall not be construed as creating a presumption
that medical malpractice has occurred." 42 U.S.C. § 11137(d) (1994). However, even
with this clause added, the American Medical Association remained adamantly opposed to the reporting provision and withdrew its support for the Data Bank when
Congress retained this provision. Instead, the AMA has chosen to develop an alternative data bank for health care consumers that will contain data on ALL practitioners, not just those with negative information. The information will consist of the
education, training, and specialty of a doctor as well as any adverse medical staff and
licensure actions and convictions for violent crimes and crimes related to health care.
AMA President Outlines Plan to Create Alternative to PractitionerData Bank, 2
HEALTH CARE POL'Y REPORT (1994). But see, Janice Perrone, AMA Wants Bad Doctors Off Its Membership Rolls, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 9, 1991, at 1 (noting that since
the beginning of 1990, state medical boards have revoked or suspended more than
1000 licenses while the AMA identified only several dozen members as revocation
candidates).
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Additionally, many contended that small settlements should
not be reported, as they might reflect nuisance suits that were
cheaper to settle than litigate.28 However, Congress chose not
to exempt any settlement after reflecting on the difficulty in deciding an appropriate cutoff point, and noted that a "significant
number of small payments may

. . .

represent truly meritorious

claims," citing as an example "an extremely incompetent physician in a particular specialty [who] '29might rarely face claims
greater than a few thousand dollars.
Fourth, a medical society must report when it "takes a professional review action [that]'30adversely affects the membership of a

physician in the society."
Congress believed that all the information cited above could
provide hospitals with a more complete profile on a physician's
competency, enhancing a hospital's ability to make informed de31
cisions regarding staffing privileges.
These reporting requirements would mean nothing if the information was not available to those who make hiring and
credentialing decisions. Therefore, Congress included query

provisions that require hospitals that wish to grant privileges to

a health care practitioner to query the Data Bank before granting privileges and at least once every subsequent two years. 32

The querying provisions spell out the minimum duty of care that
hospitals must exercise in selecting and reappointing its medical

staff.33 Thus, the HCQIA essentially establishes a national mini-

mum standard for hospital credentialing. Hospitals are presumed to have knowledge of the information in the Data Bank
28. H.R. Rep. No. 903 at 14, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6397.
29. Id. Congress directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to study
and report whether information on small payments should continue. 42 U.S.C.
§ 11131(d) (1994).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1)(C) (1994).
31. 132 CONG. REC. E735 (Mar. 12, 1986) (statement of Rep. Wyden).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 11135(a) (1994) (Recall the term "hospital" used in this article
includes all health care entities defined by 42 U.S.C. § 11151(4)(A).).
33. Ryzen, supra note 13, at 419. Of course, the hospital's use of the information
obtained in the credentialing and peer review processes is vital to accomplishing the
Act's goal. The HCQIA contains provisions intended to enhance these processes,
which is beyond the scope of this article. For more information, see Lisa J. Acevedo,
To Review or Not to Review: Antitrust Liabilities and Peer Review Protections,27 J.
HEALTH & Hosp. L. 321 (1994); Scott M. Smith, Annotation, Construction and Application of Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (42 US.C.S. §§ 11101-11152),
121 A.L.R. FED. 255 (1994).
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when defending a medical malpractice action, 34 and noncompliance may result in hospital liability for negligent credentialing. 35
Congress designed the Data Bank system to successfully track
the competency of practitioners by catching information on the
incompetent doctor both coming and going. By designing the
system in this fashion, the system inhibits an incompetent physician's ability to conceal a checkered past, and makes it more
difficult for the "bad doc" to obtain privileges at another facility
or in another state.
B.

The Success of the Data Bank

There is a great debate over whether the Data Bank is a "success." While a definitive answer is not available, two things are
clear: (1) it depends on how one defines "success," and (2) it
depends on whom one represents.36
On the one hand, the Division of Quality Assurance, with the
Bureau of Health Professions, Health Resources and Services
Administration, Public Health Service, Department of Health
and Human Services, which runs the Data Bank, reports that
the system is working.37 The Data Bank opened on September
1, 1990. Initial problems, such as backlogs due to the tremendous volume of inquiries by hospitals, have been corrected and
it appears to be running smoothly. During the Data Bank's first
eighteen months of operation, there were over 1.2 million inquires and approximately 20,000 "matches." (A match occurs
when the Data Bank finds negative information on a queried
practitioner.) As of the beginning of April 1992, the Data Bank
had found 33,000 matches. The majority of matches, 28,000,
concerned malpractice payments, and 5000 were related to adverse professional actions. During this time, the Data Bank
identified approximately 6000 doctors who have moved from
34. H.R. Rep. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 18, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 6401.
35. Scott C. Pugsley, Implementing the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 23
J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 42 (1990).
36. Compare Robert E. Oshel et al., The National PractitionerData Bank: The
First 4 Years, 110 PUB. HEALTH REP. 383 (1995); Ron Wyden, Commentary, Transparency: A PrescriptionAgainst Malpractice, 110 PuB. HEALTH REP. 380 (1995); Data
Bank Inquiries Yielding More 'Matches' on Prior Adverse Actions, 3 BNA's MEDICARE REP. 349 (1992), with James S. Todd, Commentary, Just Numbers or Knowledge?, 110 PUB. HEALTH REP. 377 (1995).
37. Oshel et al., supra note 36, at 394.
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"state to state to avoid medical disciplinary action.

' 38

"By the

end of 1994, the Data Bank had processed more than 4.5 million
requests for information on practitioners, more than 1.5 million
of which were received in 1994 alone.... During 1994, 7.9 per'39
cent of queries were matched.

The Inspector General's Office surveyed hospitals and managed care organizations (MCOs) and reported the following:
"[Eighty-three] percent of hospital officials and [ninety-six] percent of MCO officials we surveyed regarded the Data Bank reports they received on practitioners to be useful to them .... In

regard to the impact of the reports, we found that [two] percent
of the Data Bank reports in our sample led hospital officials to
make different privileging decisions than they would have made
without them and that [three] percent had the same effect on
'40
MCO officials.

But others have quite a different perception of the Data
Bank. The AMA has identified adverse effects and high costs
associated with the National Practitioner Data Bank. "In 1993,
the Physicians Insurers Association of America stated that
[ninety-seven] percent of their companies reported that physicians are less willing to settle claims as a result of the NPDB. Of
malpractice reports, [twenty-one] percent of the payments were
made for claims that were considered clearly defensible by the
insurer, and presumably there are episodes of malpractice that
never result in any action.

'41

The president of the AMA noted

that $9.9 million was paid to the bank in querying fees, and
pointed out that those who must report and query incur the cost
of preparing and reviewing the query. He also questioned the
use of pure statistics of numbers of reports, queries, and
matches to "prove" that the Data Bank is working. "Given all
of these concerns, one has to wonder what really is the value of
'42
the Data Bank?

Julie Campbell, the medical staff services director at a California hospital, cites a good example of how the Data Bank works
well. Ms. Campbell's hospital disciplined a doctor, revoked his
privileges, and reported him to the Data Bank. The doctor sub38. Karen Sandrick, Two Years and Running: The National PractitionerData Bank
Begins to Roll, but Issues Remain, HOSPITALS, Feb. 5, 1993, at 44 (1993).
39. Oshel et al., supra note 36, at 383 & 384 table 1.
40. Mark R. Yessian, Commentary, Putting the Controversy Aside, How Is the
Data Bank Doing?, 110 PUB. HEALTH REP. 381 (1995).
41. Todd, supra note 36, at 378.
42. Id.
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sequently tried to obtain privileges at another institution. He
attempted to conceal his past problems and did not disclose to
the credentialing committee of the second hospital the disciplinary action taken by the first hospital. However, the chairman
of the credentials committee called the first institution after receiving the doctor's Data Bank report, which documented the
adverse action. After discussing the matter, the second institution claimed it was contemplating denying the doctor's privileges. This would result in another adverse action being logged
in the Data Bank against this particular doctor. Campbell believes Data Bank reports will "stop this particular physician
from running place to place. ' 43 Thus, the HCQIA is accomplishing its goal of preventing incompetent doctors who are removed from the staff of one hospital from obtaining privileges at
another. If even one harmful doctor is caught, then the Data
Bank has done its job.
II.

THE UNITED KINGDOM'S REPORTING SYSTEM: THE
NATIONAL CONFIDENTIAL ENQUIRY INTO

PERIOPERATIVE DEATHS

Medical malpractice is not unique to the United States.
Where there is health care, there is medical negligence. Many
countries address medical negligence in different ways, but we
should all strive to improve the quality of health care.
While health care providers in the United States are subject to
both internal and external health care quality assurance and risk
management programs, only five percent of NHS hospitals"
have a risk management office.4 5 Risk management and quality
assurance programs are the two most effective mechanisms used
by hospitals in the United States to prevent medical liability
claims. Risk management programs identify problem areas and
develop policies to prevent future accidents, while quality assurance programs establish "organizational structures, operational
processes, and individual assessments of outcomes that address
43.

Sandrick, supra note 38, at 44.

44. "NHS hospitals" are hospitals run by the government, providing health care at
no charge to the patient. The health care system in the United Kingdom is centered
around the NHS, although there are some private hospitals, which charge patients for
care. For information about the structure of the NHS and the hospital systems in the
United Kingdom, see BRYAN RAYNER, HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
(1994); Tingle, supra note 7, at 195-97.
45. Interview with Denny Van Liew, Director of Healthcare Risk Solutions Limited, London (Jan. 9, 1995).
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the patient care delivered by all health care providers-physi46
cians, technicians, nurses, and other physician extenders.
Both are essential to ensure quality care and help to identify the
cause of medical errors. Since neither of these programs is used
in the United Kingdom, it is not surprising that the United Kingdom has no detailed information on the epidemiology of medical accidents. Fortunately, the prospect of increasing quality
assurance checks in the United Kingdom appears promising.
A.

Setting the Stage for NCEPOD

With the 1990 reforms of the NHS came decentralization, allowing NHS trust hospitals to administer the funds they receive
annually from the government. Additionally, the 1990 reforms
transferred the responsibility for paying for clinical negligence
damages to each individual NHS trust hospital; each trust hospital must pay for its liability claims from its own operating
funds-the funds allocated to provide health care. 48 In order for
the NHS trust hospitals to obtain commercial insurance, the
Secretary of State must exercise its power to do so.49 To date,
the Secretary has not exercised this power. 50
Consequently, as the responsibilities and liabilities shift, individual hospital administrators under the "new NHS" have
started to assess hospital performance and to implement quality
assurance checks, or "audits," of individual physician performance. These administrators realize that the payment of a substantial number of claims could seriously affect a hospital's
operating budget.51
While audits are not new to the United Kingdom, the manner
in which the information is being collected and disseminated is
changing. The literature indicates that large-scale audits probably began in the 1970's with a Large Bowel Cancer Study, which
illustrated a vast range of outcomes for patients who had under46.

SAL FISCINA ET AL., MEDICAL LIABILITY

349 (1991).

47.

See Graham Neale, Clinical Analysis of 100 Medicolegal Cases, 307
MED. J. 1483 (1993).

48.

Michael A. Jones, Letter: Making Doctors More Careful, THE

BRIT.

INDEPENDENT

(London), Sept. 21, 1993, at 25; Stephen L. Heasell, Economic Aspects of Medical
Negligence in the Context of the National Health Service in Britain, 3 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 205, 217-18 (1994).
49. National Health Service and Community Care Act, 1990, c.19, § 21 (Eng. &
Wales).

50. Jones, supra note 48, at 25.
51.
LEGAL

H. Brendan Devlin, Measuring the Surgeon's Performance, AVMA

MED.

&

J., Apr. 1993, at 8, 9.
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gone large bowel resections 52 for cancer. The study involved
ninety-four surgeons in twenty-three hospitals. The early reports analyzed the integrity of the intestinal anastomosis. In
other words, the study evaluated whether sutures that were used
to sew the remaining health portions of the bowel together held
or leaked. If the anastomosis leaked, the contents of the bowel
drained into the abdominal cavity. Overall, the study found that
thirteen percent of the anastomoses failed or leaked. But when
the study evaluated the success of the surgery on an individual
basis, it showed that some surgeons had a failure rate as low as
one-half of one percent while others' failure rates exceeded
thirty percent. The consequences of this variation were significant-patients whose anastomoses held and did not leak remained in the hospital for an average of 25.4 days, whereas
patients whose anastomoses failed or leaked spent an average of
45.7 days in the hospital. More frightening, however, was the
difference in the death rates-patients whose anastomoses held
had a 7.1% chance of dying, while patients whose bowel resection leaked had a 22% chance of dying. 3
The results of this study had a significant impact on the medical profession. First, after the early results on the anastomosis
failure rate were discussed with the participating surgeons, the
failure rate dropped, from 14.2% in 1976 to 10.9% in 1977, illustrating that surgeons can learn from their mistakes. 4 At the
time of the report, H. Brendan Devlin, a consultant surgeon and
later Secretary of the National Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths, extrapolated these findings to show that on a
national level, if the failure or anastomosis leakage rate was lowbe preered to five percent, "450 post-operative deaths would
55
vented and [1]4,000,000 [would be] saved each year.

Second, this study illustrated that a surgeon's skill, or lack of
skill, is directly related to a patient's outcome. In other words, it
demonstrated on a large scale what many in the United States
already knew: doctors' skills must be assessed to ensure that
they are delivering a high quality of care to their patients.
The NCEPOD was launched in 1988 as a result of the effectiveness of the Large Bowel Study and the success of a smaller
52. During a bowel resection, the surgeon removes the diseased, cancerous portion of the colon and mends the remaining healthy portion. The site where the
healthy portions are sewn together is the anastomosis.
53. Devlin, supra note 51, at 9.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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audit conducted during 1985 and 1986 in three NHS regions, the
56
Confidential Inquiry into Perioperative Deaths (CEPOD).
Audits of patient care were needed to establish standards of care
and ensure equity of access to safe care.5
B.

The Goal, Structure, and Success of NCEPOD

Representatives from the Royal Colleges of Medicine operate
and oversee the NCEPOD independently from the Department
of Health and National Health Services. The NCEPOD is endorsed by the Association of Surgeons and the Association of
Anaesthetists in Great Britain. The goal of NCEPOD is to "reveal the standard of anesthetic and surgical care available in
hospitals and to point out, in what parts and in what ways, this
standard might be improved. ' 58 The instigators of the
NCEPOD maintain that the data are not collected to place
blame on practitioners; rather, NCEPOD was designed to be
more akin to a "watchdog" of health care quality. Thus, the results are published with all identifying information removed
from the reports, including the names of the patients, the practitioners, and the hospitals. 9 Physician confidentiality is one
facet of the NCEPOD that differs radically from the Data Bank
in the United States.
To meet its goal, the NCEPOD collects data from written
questionnaires on failed surgery cases, defined as cases in which
60
the patient dies within thirty days of the surgical procedure.
While the questionnaires are distributed to the hospitals and
practitioners, because the enquiry is voluntary, there are no
sanctions for failing to participate. Members of NCEPOD study
and analyze the data, along with other reports from the attending physician and hospital, and disseminate the findings to
practitioners.
While it would appear that anonymity would make the United
Kingdom's data collection bank more palatable to practitioners,
Luisa Dillner, NCEPOD: Surgeons and Anaesthetists Could Do Better, 304
J. 1071 (1992). The Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths (CEPOD), which was created in 1982, studied the three NHS regions for 12 months. The
first NCEPOD report was generated in 1990, based on 1989 data. Devlin, supra note
56.

BRIT. MED.

51, at 9, 10.
57. Devlin, supra note 51, at 9.
58. Lunn, supra note 9, at 6.
59. Id. Unlike the United States, no entity is required to look at these reports.
Because the survey is both anonymous and voluntary, it is more of an information
bank than a manner of checking a physician's credentials.

60. Id.
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approximately thirty-five percent of practitioners overall did not
return the reporting questionnaires. 61 Even more problematic
are the findings of a study conducted to assess NHS hospitals'
effectiveness in identifying and reporting deaths to the
NCEPOD.62 A review of the various types of records of three
large London hospitals indicated poor data collection and reporting. The reviewers concluded that if this sample was representative of the accuracy of other NHS hospitals, "almost half of
the eligible deaths are likely to be missed. ' 63 While subsequent
changes were then implemented to improve reporting, a followup examination six months later showed no real
improvements. 64
The originators of the NCEPOD stressed that its validity as a
clinical audit system will "depend on the inclusion of all relevant
cases." 65 Thus, the failure of hospitals and practitioners to accurately report obviously diminishes its ability to improve patient
care. On the other hand, since the findings are diseminated to
practitioners, they may be able to adjust their practices based
upon this information and, thus, improve the care that they
provide.
Yet another problem exists that renders the NCEPOD less
effective than it could be. The cases reported are difficult to
analyze given the appalling lack of information documented in
patients' medical records. For example, the 1990 NCEPOD report disclosed 2558 patient deaths.66 These patients' medical
records failed to identify the operating surgeon fourteen percent
of the time and failed to indicate the patient's operative diagnosis
fifty-four percent of the time. In many cases, the physician
notes were extremely poor, sometimes consisting of only a "single 'one liner.' 67 These omissions hinder the NCEPOD's ability to accurately assess the causes of medical error and to
identify poor physicians.
In spite of the NCEPOD's shortcomings, the Minister for
Health for the United Kingdom proclaimed the audit a success
61. Id. This high rate of failure to return the questionnaires is likely because participation is voluntary.
62. L. Clark et al., Effective Audit: Reporting to the National Confidential Enquiry
into PerioperativeDeaths, 304 BRIT. MED. J. 1472 (1992).
63. Id. at 1473.
64. Id. at 1474.
65. Id. at 1472. NCEPOD went so far as to appoint consultants serving as local
district reporters to ensure that all relevant cases were reported.
66. Devlin, supra note 51, at 10.
67. Id.
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in a July 9, 1993, statement. Then-Minister Brian Mawhinney
applauded the NCEPOD and claimed it an "important study for
patients as it provides valuable reassurance about the quality of
surgical and anaesthetic care within the NHS." 6 He welcomed
the NCEPOD's "conclusion that across the range of specialties
covered 'the prevailing standard of surgery and care is excellent.' ",69 However, his statement provided nothing of real substantive value. While Dr. Mawhinney claimed that some
problems that were identified in previous NCEPOD reports,
such as the percentage of consultants involved in decisions
about whether or not to operate, were being corrected, he failed
to address other problem areas identified. He did, however,
stress that clinicians and managers need to work closely to improve the results.
Dr. Mawhinney's accolades must be put into perspective: the
1992 NCEPOD report that Dr. Mawhinney extolled was based
on a random sample of over 2000 questionnaires returned between January 1990 and December 1990, representing a compliance rate of just over sixty percent.70
However, there do appear to be positive effects from the
NCEPOD. For example, in 1987, CEPOD (the precursor to
NCEPOD) found that only sixty-three percent of consultants
(akin to our supervising physicians who work with residents)
participated in preoperative decision making, with adverse effects resulting from the lack of experience of the juniors or "registrars. ' 7 1 The 1990 NCEPOD report found an improvementeighty-nine percent of preoperative decisions were consultant
based.72 Additionally, the NCEPOD's 1987 report found only
forty-seven percent of surgeries were performed or supervised
by consultants, whereas in 1990, sixty-seven percent of the operations were performed or supervised by consultants.73 In these
instances, the NCEPOD appears to be instrumental in effecting
change, or at least identifying problem areas that need
correction.
68. UK: Dr. Brian Mawhinney Welcomes 1991/92 Report of National Confidential
Enquiry Into Perioperative Deaths, Dept. of Health, U.K. Gov't Press Releases, Sept.
7, 1993.
69. Id.

70.

Dillner, supra note 56, at 1071.

71.
72.
73.

Devlin, supra note 51, at 11.
Id.
Id.
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But simply identifying problems is not enough. For example,
the rates of death resulting from operations performed by registrars is twice as high as that resulting from operations performed
by consultants, 74 indicating that either registrars need more supervision or consultants should be performing the surgery. It is
also frightening to learn that while the incidence of perioperative death in NCEPOD's control group is one in twenty, the incidence of death jumps to one in four for surgeries performed
outside normal working hours. 75 Finally, the NCEOPD documented the need for twenty-four-hour operating rooms and intensive care and emergency services to reduce unnecessary
deaths and to improve the quality of care delivered.
However, NHS budgets are tight and money may be unavailable to implement the needed improvements. This too shows the
deficiencies of relying solely on a voluntary system to improve
the quality of care.
III.

PARALLEL GOALS BUT DIVERGENT MECHANISMS

The United Kingdom's NCEPOD is in some ways parallel to
the United States' National Practitioner Data Bank. Like the
Data Bank, the NCEPOD is a national clearinghouse for information. The NCEPOD's goal parallels that of the Data Bank:
both are designed to improve the quality of care by identifying
and reducing medical errors. Both are dependent on the medical field's cooperation.
However, the mechanisms used by each country are quite different. The NCEPOD focuses on treatment outcomes to identify medical errors. In a general sense, its purpose is to identify
the causes of poor outcomes and the appropriate therapy,
thereby improving the quality of care. To the contrary, the Data
Bank looks to improve the quality of care by focusing on an
individual practitioner's performance or behavior.
The NCEPOD is a unique quality improvement tool. It appears that the NCEPOD's designers borrowed one-half of the
United States' risk management scheme and one-half of the
United States' quality assurance mechanism. The NCEPOD
identifies problem areas as does risk management and assesses
treatment outcomes as does a quality assurance program. However, it fails to achieve completely the goals of either program.
74.

Louisa Dillner, Patients Are Still Dying Unnecessarily, Says NCEPOD, 307

BRIT. MED.

75.

J. 643 (1993).
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First, no effort is made to identify or sanction the incompetent
practitioners. In spite of the fact that the study identifies
problems, there is no personal accountability built into the system. Rather, it is assumed that practitioners will correct their
problems on their own, or, alternatively, the NHS will resolve
the issues. However, self-policing has inherent problems and
should not exist as the sole mechanism for quality assurance.
Second, there is no followup to determine the effect of the reports. The only measure of success is the annual death rate.
This raises another glaring problem, as death rates are not good
measures of the quality of care: "too few deaths occur to make
them sufficiently sensitive. ' 76 Only 0.6% of surgical operations

end in death, according to Dr. Devlin. 77 Dr. Mike Pringle, a
general practitioner, concurs, stating that deaths are "too infrequent to use to monitor ... the quality of care .... -"7 Even if
the death rate is accepted as a good indicator, the success of the
NCEPOD is dependent on all deaths being reported; evidence
indicates that this is not being done.
It would be rash to exclaim that the NCEPOD fails to serve as
a quality assurance mechanism and thus should be dismantled.
However, the NHS needs to be more responsive to the annual
NCEPOD report and should supply additional funding for much
needed health care services, such as maintaining twenty-fourhour staffing of operating rooms, increasing the number of intensive care units, maintaining twenty-four-hour emergency
services at all hospitals, and increasing the involvement of consultants in health care decisions.
The NCEPOD could become a more efficient quality assurance mechanism if parts of the United States' Data Bank system
were implemented. First, anonymity should not be a hallmark
of the NCEPOD. Truly incompetent physicians should be identified and sanctioned. Second, the NHS would do well to
change the standard of care where results so indicate. For example, given the data reported, the NHS may wish to mandate that
consultants supervise or perform surgeries. It appears that if
this step were taken, patient care would improve. Third, the
NHS in general and hospitals and physicians in particular must
improve their record keeping and reporting systems. This mea76.

Tony Delamothe, Using Outcome Research in Clinical Practice, 308

MED. J.

BRIT.

1583, 1584 (1994).

77.

Id.

78.

Id.
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sure would ensure more accountability by identifying incompetent doctors, and would assist the study in accomplishing its goal
to improve patient care.
Across the Atlantic, Congress appears to have created a valuable quality assurance mechanism when it established the Data
Bank. In spite of contrary evaluations of its usefulness, the Data
Bank provides hospitals with essential information necessary to
improve patient care by identifying potentially incompetent
physicians. Many hospitals claim that obtaining information
from the Data Bank makes them more secure in their decisions
to appoint or reappoint physicians, as the information may confirm a positive evaluation or reveal information a physician has
failed to report. 79 Thus, the information contained in the Data
Bank is a vital tool, essential to protecting the quality of care
that patients receive.
The Data Bank system, however, is not valued by all and has
its share of critics. One anesthesiologist remarked: "When other
professionals screw up, it is not reported. Why should doctors
be singled out? It is unfair. The Data Bank should be abolished. ' ' 80 This physician echoed criticisms raised by other physicians complaining that information about settlement payments
is not useful. 81 To illustrate his point, he stated that some surgery departments routinely reimburse patients' dental bills if
they claim something happened to their teeth during surgery. In
fact, the claims are rarely investigated. Thus, "if these settlements are reported, they are meaningless." 8
Certainly, contentions that malpractice settlement information is unhelpful are not unfounded; it is often cheaper to settle
a case than to defend the allegations. Perhaps few, small settlements against a practitioner are meaningless. However, when
hospital staffs are determining whether or not to grant privileges
to a doctor, it is helpful to know how many times the physician
has settled cases, including nuisance cases. Certainly, the staffs
making these decisions are in the position to evaluate the utility
of the information. Returning to the anesthesiologist's scenario,
a hospital might not want a practitioner who settles numerous
79. Hospitals Warming to Use of Physician Data Bank in Hiring, MOD.

HEALTH-

Jan. 16, 1995, at 24.
80. Interview with Anaesthesiologist at Michael Reese One Day Surgery, Chicago

CARE,

(Jan. 19, 1995).
81. Hospitals Warming to Use of PhysicianData Bank in Hiring,supra note 79, at
24.

82.

Interview, supra note 80.
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claims for damaged teeth. The hospital might view the physician
as careless, and may be concerned about the physician's overall
competency. Hospitals should be entitled to make staffing decisions with full knowledge, weighing the value of such information as they choose.
However, a key issue facing Congress and the health care profession is whether the National Practitioner Data Bank should
be open to the public. This is obviously an even wider departure
from NCEPOD.
Representative Ron Wyden proposed an amendment to the
HCQIA in April 1994 that, among other things, would allow
public access to the Data Bank.83 Representative Wyden stated
at a press conference: "It's paternalistic to suggest consumers
can't understand this information. Consumer choice is the hall84
mark of every serious health reform proposal on the table.
This would allow the "buyers of health care" to select high quality physicians and reject those of poorer quality. This market
force approach could drive the poor "performers" out of business and improve the overall quality of health care.
This approach serves as the basis for a recommendation made
by the Advisory Committee on Public Disclosure of Physician
Information, appointed in 1994 by the Massachusetts Secretary
of Consumer Affairs.8 5 The Advisory Committee proposed that
the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine, the governmental entity that licenses and disciplines physicians, provide
to the public in a "user-friendly format" the following information or "Physician Profile" about Massachusetts-licensed physicians: "general information about physician education, training,
specialty credentialing, employment, and achievements," as well
as malpractice claims history, criminal convictions, and licensing
and hospital disciplinary sanctions. 86 This proposal seems to
combine pieces of the Data Bank and NCEPOD-like the Data
Bank it includes specific information about individual physi83. Health Care Quality Improvement Act Amendments of 1994, H.R. 4274, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Wyden/Klug Introduce Bill to Open Data Bank Information to
the Public, 5 BNA's MEDICARE REP. 468 (1994). The amendment would mandate

state medical boards to query the bank before licensing a physician moving from a
different state as well as prior to relicensing. State and federal hospitals would be

required to report to the Data Bank just as private hospitals must. Liability insurers
would be required to state if a settlement was made without the physician's consent.
84. Wyden/Klug Introduce Bill, supra note 83, at 468.
85. Frances H. Miller, Illuminating Patient Choice: Releasing Physician-Specific

Data to the Public, 8 Loy.
86. Id. at 128.
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cians, but like NCEPOD it makes this information available to
the members of the public, the Massachusetts proposal to the
public in general and NCEPOD to other practitioners. If accepted, this proposal could truly put information in the hands of
the health care consumer, the patient. Those compiling and disseminating the profiles can learn a great deal about the administrative successes and failures of both the Data Bank and
NCEPOD in an attempt to run the program efficiently and

effectively.
CONCLUSION

There are a variety of methods that can be used to improve
the quality of health care. The United Kingdom uses a national
clearinghouse that collects and disseminates information related
to the way in which health care is provided. If run effectively, it
could be useful in establishing national standards of care,
thereby improving the quality of health care. The United States
uses a national data bank that collects information on individual
practitioners. If used effectively, it could prevent incompetent
physicians from being granted hospital privileges, thereby virtually eliminating their ability to practice. This, in turn, can help
in the fight to rid the medical profession of incompetent practitioners. (Certainly, this fight would be easier if state licensing
authorities could access the information as well.)
Perhaps the differences between the system in the United
States and that in the United Kingdom are reflective of the differences in the attitudes of each country's citizens.
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